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MERGERS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS: THE
COLUMBIA STEEL CASE, THE SUPREME COURT
AND A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 1947 TERM *
By SERGEI S. ZLINKOFF t AND ROBERT C. BARNARD $
INTRODUCTION
The ablest study of the Supreme Court's decisions on this sub-
ject appeared sixteen years ago.' Prior to the injunction proceedings
this Term instituted by the Department of Justice to restrain the
United States Steel Corporation from acquiring assets of a leading
West Coast steel fabricator,' neither the Federal Trade Commission
* The following article while complete in itself is part of a study of all the Su-
preme Court's decisions during the October 1947 Term in the trade regulation field.
The other portions of the study are being published in a series of companion articles.
See Patents, Procedure and the Anti-Trust Laws, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1948) ;
Basing Points and Quantity Discounts, 48 COL. L. REv. 985 (1948); The Motion Pic-
ture Industry and the Sherman Act, which will appear in the December, 1948, issue of
the YAIE LAw JOURNAL. The article in the GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REvIEW con-
tains an introduction to the entire study.
t B. S. S., 1935, College of the City of New York; LL. B., 1938, Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law. Editor, Columbia Law Review, 1936-8. Author of numerous
articles in legal periodicals. Member of the New York Bar.
: B. A., 1935, Reed College; B. A., 1938, B. C. L., 1939, Rhodes Scholar, Oxford
University. Former Chief Legal Consultant, Office of the Assistant Solicitor-General
and Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States. Member of the
Bar of the State of Washington and of the District of Columbia.
1. Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL. L. REv. 179
(1932). This study likewise appears in condensed form in HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE
CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 46-88 (TNEC
Monograph 38, 1941). In this latter study Professor Handler outlines a suggested
legislative program for dealing with the deficiencies in this body of law as evolved by
the Supreme Court. Id. at 88-90.
2. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495 (1948).
(151)
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nor the Department of Justice, with a single exception' have brought
any cases in this field before the United States Supreme Court.
This is surprising in view of the complete change during this interval
in the personnel of the Court. The failure of both the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice to institute during the
last decade a series of litigations to carry out Congressional intention
and "arrest the creation of . . .monopolies in their incipiency" 4 is
difficult to comprehend when viewed in the light of the following
facts :
A. The State of the Supreme Court Decisions.
After a meticulous study of the little more than a handful of
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the permissible extent of cor-
porate mergers and combinations, Professor Milton Handler in 1932
concluded:
"This review of the Supreme Court decisions has shown
there is support in the body of authority for almost every position
that might conceivably be taken; contrarywise there are embar-
rassing holdings and dicta which no one theory can fully explain,
short of regarding the cases as fundamentally opposed to one
another . . .And as for predicting what the Court will do, the
safest counsel, of course, is to follow its latest pronouncement, at
the same time keeping an eye upon the most recent appointees
to the bench." '
3. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. FTC, 291 U. S. 587 (1934), Justices
Hughes, Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo dissenting. It therefore cannot fairly be called
the submission of a case to the present Supreme Court. The Arrow-Hart decision
affirmed and extended the previous decision of the Supreme Court (four justices dis-
senting) in FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554 (1926) wherein the Supreme
Court made Section 7 of the Clayton Act a nullity by holding that it only prohibited
the acquisitions of stock and not of assets. In the Arrow-Hart case the majority went
further and held that even if stock was first acquired, if the assets were acquired before
the Federal Trade Commission ordered divestiture the Federal Trade Commission was
without any jurisdiction to proceed further.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act reads: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition
may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so
acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in
any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
"No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital of two or more corporations engaged in commerce where
the effect of such acquisition, or the use of such stock by the voting or granting of
proxies or otherwise, may be to substantially lessen competition between such corpora-
tions, or any of them, whose stock or other share capital is so acquired, or to restrain
such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line
of commerce. . . ." 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1946) ; for a criticism
of the Western Meat and Arrow-Hart line of decisions see Handier, Industrial Mer-
gers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL. L. Rsv. 179, 266-268 (1932) ; and HANDLER, A
STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
86-88 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
4. Senate Judiciary Committee reporting out the Clayton Act. SEN. REP. No.
695, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
5. Handier, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL. L. REv. 179, 242
(1932).
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"But when all is said and done, the fact remains that the
decisions are in good part inconsistent and the opinions hope-
lessly confused. No serious attempt has been made by the
Supreme Court to clarify the subject or to offer any guidance to
the bar . . . Its opinions have been marked by a disheartening
lack of candor. No explanation has been given for obvious shifts
in view." 0
B. The Final Report and Recommendations of the Bipartisan Tem-
porary National Economic Committee.
In 1938 following a message by the late Preident Franklin D.
Roosevelt to Congress urging the creation of a non-partisan body to
study the subject of the growing concentration of economic power,
Congress created the Temporary National Economic Committee,
familiarly known as TNEC, to conduct a comprehensive investigation
of the subject and submit its recommendations for dealing with the
problem.7 After conducting the most exhaustive study that the basic
structure of our economy has ever received I the Committee submitted
its Report and Recommendations to Congress in 1941. Condensed
into only forty-odd well-written pages, the Report repeatedly em-
phasized the various aspects of the growing concentration of eco-
nomic power and the dangers that such concentration carry to our
democratic way of life and our free enterprise economy.
"No person who with an open mind reviews the materials
gathered by this Committee can fail to conclude that the rise of
political centralism is largely the product of economic centralism
. . . the Temporary National Economic Committee. . . avows
its faith in free enterprise. Every recommendation which it makes
is intended to keep enterprise free . . . economic power which
becomes so great that it can regiment men enjoys but a temporary
triumph, for eventually by its restrictive policies, it invites and
makes inevitable its own subordination to arbitrary political
power . . . so great a proportion of all national savings and all
national wealth have fallen under the control of a few organized
enterprises with the opportunity of those individuals who con-
stitute the next generation will be completely foreclosed unless,
by common consent of leadership in business and government, we
undertake to reverse the trends responsible for the present crises.
We know that most of the wealth and income of the country is
owned by a few large corporations, that these corporations in turn
6. Id. at 271.
7. See Zlinkoff, The Roosevelt Administration's Battle to Preserve an Economy
of Competitive Private Enterprise, 5 NAT. LAw. GUILD Q. 201, 204-207 (1945).
8. The Hearings conducted occupy more than 20,000 printed pages and an addi-
tional 3300 exhibits. These Hearings were supplemented by 43 monographic studies
prepared by scholars throughout the country.
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are owned by an infinitesimally small number of people and that
the profits from the operation from these corporations go to a
very small group with the result that the opportunities, whether
corporate or individual, are constantly being restricted . . . it is
generally agreed . . . that competition must be maintained as
the principle of our economy, for every one seems to acknowledge
that the alternative to competition is some form of concentrated
government authority which might easily destroy democracy." 9
C. The Third Merger Movement 1940-1947.
The Federal Trade Commission has, since the end of World War
II, repeatedly called attention to the vast merger movement that has
been in progress since 1940.10 The merger movement has continuously
been in progress in this country for over 50 years, the first great era
of trust building lasting from about 1897 to 1903. The second im-
portant merger period occurred during 1925 to 1929.11 During the last
seven years a third great merger movement has been progressing
characterized by the very large organizations buying out small in-
dependents. Thirty per cent of the companies which have been merged
since 1940 have been absorbed by corporations with assets over fifty
million dollars; and an additional forty per cent of the total "have
been taken over by corporations with assets from five to forty-nine
million dollars . . . the distinctly small firms, those with less than
9. TNEC, FINAL REPORT AND RECOIMEDATIONS 5, 7, 9, 25 (1941).
10. See, e. g., Report of FTC to Congress entitled FTC, REPORT ON THE PRESENT
TREND OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (Sen. Doc. No. 17, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1947).
11. See THORP AND CROWDER, THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY 231-234 (TNEC
Monograph 27, 1941).
This brief study contains the following illuminating table (p. 233):
Mergers and acquisitions in manufacturing and mining,
by quarters, 1919-1939
NET NUMIBER OF CONCERNS DISAPPEARING'
Quarter Quarter
Year I II III IV Total Year I II III IV Total2
1919 57 82 147 125 438 1930 204 237 156 189 799
1920 209 186 188 166 760 1931 163 142 87 71 464
1921' 184 99 80 122 487 1932 7 102 46 40 203
1922 86 53 82 76 309 1933 19 43 33 12 120
1923 84 67 44 105 311 1934 19 25 34 23 101
1924 110 71 87 85 368 1935 36 27 38 24 130
1925 124 104 127 175 554 1936 39 25 27 32 126
1926 286 236 171 146 856 1937 32 27 29 31 124
1927 161 247 220 213 870 1938 32 20 22 33 110
1928 197 315 242 274 1058 1939 24 22 16 25 87
1929 349 395 312 160 1245
'Number of concerns merged less number of mergers plus concerns acquired.
'Annual totals are larger than the sum of the quarterly figures, because they
include a small number of cases where exact dates were not available.
'Includes 1 merger of 60 concerns.
Part IV of Monograph 27 consists of brief studies of the history of concentration
in seven industries, agricultural implements; automobile; copper; cotton textile; iron
and steel; petroleum and rayon yarn. Id. at 234-264.
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one million dollars worth of assets, have made only eleven per cent
of the acquisitions." 12
It has been the distinctly small firm which has been increasingly
obliterated in the present merger movement. Of all of the firms
bought out since 1940, ninety-three per cent had assets of less than
five million dollars and seventy-one per cent had assets of less than
one million dollars with only four per cent of the total number of
firms bought out having assets of over ten million dollars. The
extent of additional acquisitions by our giant industrial corporations
can be seen from the fact that of the two hundred largest manufac-
turing corporations in this country one hundred and twenty-three
have made corporate acquisitions since 1940 accounting in the ag-
gregate for twenty-seven per cent of all the firms bought out. Of
these top two hundred corporations thirty-three bought out an average
of more than five companies each and thirteen purchased more than
ten companies.13
This trend is the continuation of a phenomenon whose sig-
nificance was emphasized by the pioneer work of Berle and Means
that appeared in 1932,14 the studies of the Twentieth Century Fund-
a nonpartisan research institute-published in 1937,"' the report of
the National Resources Committee appearing in 1939,16 as well as
by the report of the Smaller War Plants Corporation to Congress in
1946.17 Likewise a number of the special monographic studies sub-
mitted to Congress by the TNEC presented in detail the facts as to
the ever increasing concentration of power into fewer and fewer eco-
nomic units throughout the entire structure of our economy 18 and
even the Federal Reserve Board in 1945 submitted a similar study
showing the growing concentration, through mergers, of banking in-
stitutions in this country. 9 The unanimous conclusion of all these
studies was summarized in the following statement made on July 1,
12. FTC, SUMMARY REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE MERGER MOVEMENT, 5 (July
26, 1948).
13. Ibid.; see also the studies of the merger movement in 12 different industries
submitted by FTC in the Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 2357,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 87-126, 145-169, 170-243 (1945).
14. BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
15. BIG BusiEss, ITS GROWTH AND ITS PLACE.
16. THE STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY.
17. SMALLER WAR PLANTS CORPORATION, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND WoRLD
WAR II (Sen. Comm. Print No. 6, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1946).
18. See particularly, WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUS-
TRY (TNEC Monograph 21, 1940); THORP AND CROWDER, THE STRUCTURE OF IN-
DUSTRY (TNEC Mongraph 27, 1941); THE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 200
LARGEST NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS (TNEC Monograph 29, 1940).
19. This study was presented in the Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary
otn H. R. 2357, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 336-349 (1945).
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1946 by the Federal Trade Commission to the Small Business Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives:
"In the opinion of the Commission, the present, and still
growing, concentration of economic power in the United States
constitutes today's greatest domestic challenge to the American
theory of competitive enterprises, and along with it all that is
embodied in the meaning of the somewhat intangible, but none
the less real, meaning of 'the American way of life' and 'freedom
of enterprise' . . . large corporate consolidations make coopera-
tion within each industry or trade group easier and leads in-
evitably to cartel organizations in America as well as in Europe
. . . also private supergovernment in industry leads almost in-
evitably to political supergovernment." 20
Similarly, in urging the Supreme Court to take a more realistic
approach toward preventing the growth of monopoly power, students
of that tribunal's decisions have declared that the Court's decisions
not only sanctioned but even encouraged the merger movement.21
THiE COLUMBIA STEEL CASE
A. The Facts.
Belatedly recognizing the factual and legal developments outlined
above, the Department of Justice on March 19, 1947 announced the
formation in the anti-trust division of a Merger Unit which was
created to scrutinize all mergers in terms of the anti-trust laws.22 Only
a short while after the formation of this unit the Department of Justice
instituted as its crucial initial litigation an injunctive proceeding to pre-
vent the acquisition by the United States Steel Corporation, through
several of its subsidiaries, of the assets of a leading West Coast in-
20. FTC REPOR7 To CONGRESS ON THE PRESENT TREND OF COPORATE MERGERS
AND AcQuisTrioNs 23 (SEN. Doc. No. 17, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1947) ; see also the
testimony of Senator O'Mahoney in the Hearings on H. R. 2357: "There is an awful
lot of talk about free enterprise; but I think we have failed to note how it has been
and is being undermined. A great many of the people mistake industrial collectivism
for free enterprise . . . you can not hope to prevent the steady trend toward con-
centrated economic power . . . the two things are absolutely tied together; and the
history of the last 50 years has been the history of the steady loss to the Government
at Washington of political power by the people in the States because we have permitted
the loss of economic power to economic concentration of the kind I have been describ-
ing." Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 2357, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
6-10 (1945).
21. See, e. g., Levi, The Anti-Trust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. OF CIr. L. REv.
153, 183 (1947) ; Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Possible Instrument of Progress,
14 U. OF Cmi. L. REv. 567, 570-4 (1947). See also the testimony of Dr. Willard
Thorp in the hearings conducted by the TNEC, Part I, p. 112 (1938).
22. See Zlinkoff & Barnard, The Supreme Court and a Competitive Economy:
1946 Term, 47 COL. L. REv. 914, 930, n. 75 (1947).
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dependent steel fabricating corporation.' The facts of the litigation
are relatively simple.24
United States Steel Corporation had net assets of approximately
one and one-half billion dollars during the ten year period, 1937-1946;
during this period its average annual sales were almost one and one-
half billion dollars, and it produced almost one-third of the Nation's
production of rolled steel products. U. S. Steel is a classic example
of growth through merger and acquisition and is a completely in-
tegrated company, from raw materials through finished products,
including the ownership of railways and shipping lines to transport
raw materials and intermediate products.
The Supreme Court in 1920 by a 4 to 3 vote-with two Justices
not participating-rendered a much criticized decision 25 refusing to
find that the Government was entitled to a dissolution of the corpora-
tion as an illegal monopoly. Although it thereafter acquired a number
of additional companies its proportion of the Nation's total rolled
steel production declined to roughly 31 per cent at the beginning of
1946 as compared to 50.1 per cent that it had at the time of its forma-
tion in 1901.
Because of war time needs the United States Government built
two very large rolled steel production plants in the Far Western part
of the United States, an area that had been largely dependent for its
supplies upon Eastern producers. The largest of these plants was
erected at Geneva, Utah, and, was designed, constructed and operated
by U. S. Steel for the Government, costing nearly two hundred million
dollars. This plant had an annual capacity of more than 1,200,000
tons of steel ingots which in turn could be employed to make about
700,000 tons of plates and 250,000 tons of shapes, both plates and
shapes being types of rolled steel products. The capacity of Geneva
was approximately two and a half times that of the steel producing
plants in the Far West owned by U. S. Steel or its subsidiaries. The
other large steel producing plant in the West was located at Fontana,
23. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 71 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1947) (pre-
liminary injunction granted) ; 74 F. Supp. 671 (D. Del. 1947) (complaint dismissed
after trial on the merits); Comment, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 591 (1948); aff'd, 334
U. S. 495 (1948), Mr. Justice Reed writing the majority opinion, Justices Douglas,
Black, Murphy and Rutledge dissenting.
24. The following statement of facts has been constructed from the District
Court's findings as stated in its opinion, the briefs of the parties before the Supreme
Court and the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Reed. Unfortunately these facts are
not clearly set forth in any single place. We have limited our statement to the facts
not in dispute and where any question was raised we have so indicated.
25. United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920) ; Handier, op. cit.
supra note 1, has commented as follows upon the majority opinion (p. 257) : "the man-
ner in which it (i. e., the Supreme Court) evaluated the evidence in the Steel case is
little short of ludicrous from the viewpoint of the economist."
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California, with a productive capacity of 720,000 tons of steel ingots.
This plant was built by the Kaiser interests with Government loans.
26
Early in 1945 U. S. Steel considered making a bid for Geneva
but "because of the speculative nature of the venture and the opposi-
tion both within and without the Government to a purchase or lease
by an Eastern steel company" 27 had decided not to submit a bid and
so notified the Government on August 8, 1945. Shortly thereafter,
however, the Surplus Property Administrator wrote the President
of U. S. Steel advising him that a bid by that company for Geneva
"would be welcomed." After considerable pressure on U. S. Steel
"by various people in and out of the Government", it submitted a bid
on May 1, 1946 of $47,500,000, stating that it would spend an ad-
ditional $18,500,000 on changes and improvements, and that it like-
wise would build at a further cost of $25,000,000 a cold-reduction mill
at Pittsburg, California to utilize the Geneva produced steel. The
bid stated that U. S. Steel would sell the output of Geneva so as to
"foster the location of steel consuming manufacturing plants in the
Western States."
Three weeks later, without holding public hearings, the Director of
the War Assets Administration announced the sale of Geneva to U. S.
Steel in a publicly released letter making an administrative finding that
the bid of U. S. Steel met the objectives of the Surplus Property Act.28
The letter, already published, requested the opinion of the Attorney
General as to whether the proposed sale "will violate the anti-trust
laws" in accordance with Section 20 of the Surplus Property Act of
1944.2' That Section required that proposed disposals of Government
26. Government Reply Brief before the Supreme Court in the Columbia Steel
case, p. 11.
27. A full story of the opposition by Western consumers to the acquisition of
Geneva by U. S. Steel is set forth in SEN. REP., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1945)
being the Progress Report of the Surplus War Property Administrator, April 23,
1945, p. 8.
28. The Director of War Surplus Property found that the acceptance of United
States Steel's bid for Geneva would conform to the objectives set forth in the Surplus
Property Act. Thus it was found that the acquisition would ". . . assure the most
effective use of the Geneva Steel Plant for war purposes and common defense . ";
would ". . . stimulate full employment . . ."; would ". . . encourage and foster
postwar employment opportunities not only in the Geneva Steel Plant but also in steel
consuming industries in the West . . ."; would ". . . promote production, employ-
ment of labor and utilization of the productive capacity . . ."; would ". . . foster
the development in the West of new independent enterprises. . . . The operation of
the Geneva Steel Plant as a part of the integrated operations of United States Steel
should tend to foster the location of steel consuming manufacturing plants in the West-
ern States. . . ." Pp. 2 and 3 in the Ops. ArT'y GEN. AD. WAA 679-680.
29. 58 STAT. 765 (1944) ; 50 U. S. C. App. § 1629 (Supp. 1945) provides: "When-
ever any disposal agency shall begin negotiations for disposition to private interests of
a plant or plants or other property, which cost the Government $1,000,000 or more, or
of patents, processes, techniques or inventions, irrespective of cost, the disposal agency
shall promptly notify the Attorney General of the proposed disposition and the prob-
able terms or conditions thereof. Within a reasonable time, in no event to exceed
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owned plants costing more than a million dollars be referred to the
Attorney General for his opinion as to whether the sale would violate
the anti-trust laws. Within three weeks after the receipt of the
request, Attorney General Clark wrote a four page opinion 30 pointing
out that the total ingot capacity of U. S. Steel had declined from
35.3 per cent of the national capacity on January 1, 1939 to 31.4 per
ninety days after receiving such notification, the Attorney General shall advise the
Board and the disposal agency whether, in his opinion, the proposed disposition will
violate the antitrust laws. Upon the request of the Attorney General, the Board or
other Government agency shall furnish or cause to be furnished such information as it
may possess which the Attorney General determines to be appropriate or necessary to
enable him to give the advice called for by this section or to determine whether any
other disposition of surplus property violates the anti-trust laws. Nothing in this Act
shall impair, amend, or modify the antitrust laws or limit and prevent their application
to persons who buy or otherwise acquire property under the provisions of this Act."
30. Almost a year after Attorney General Clark rendered his opinion there ap-
peared the following copyrighted syndicated column by Colonel Robert S. Allen, New
York Times, March 28, 1947, p. 41, column 1:
"An authoritative congressional source today revealed the long-sought Anti-
Trust Division report that Attorney General Tom Clark suppressed when he ap-
proved the sale of the government's giant Geneva, Utah, Steel plant to the United
States Steel Corporation.
"The report, which Clark had suppressed, strongly disapproved the disposal
of the ultra-modem war-built plant to the dominant concern in the steel industry.
"'In short', the report declares, 'the acquisition of the Geneva Steel plant by
either of these two giant steel producers (United States Steel and Bethlehem) is
inconsistent with the very clearly stated objectives of the Surplus Property Act of
1944.'
"Although the report was made by his own anti-monopoly agency, Clark did
not send it to Congress. After holding it for weeks, he suppressed it and author-
ized the War Assets Administration to sell Geneva to U. S. Steel.
"The suppressed Anti-Trust Division report opposed the sale of Geneva to
U. S. Steel on the ground the plant would give the corporation monopolistic con-
trol of Western Steel production.
"'If this major Eastern producer obtains control of Geneva,' the report
states, 'it would control more than 50 percent of the steel production capacity west
of the Rockies. In addition, the company's access to cheap water-borne carriers
would give it virtual control of the Western market for the most profitable steel
products, such as tin plate, sheets, pipes and tubes, and a dominant position in
other steel products.
"'It can hardly be argued that U. S. Steel is a small business or that con-
centration of industrial ownership in the West would not be increased by its
acquisition of the Geneva plant. This acquisition would strengthen a regional
monopoly which, as has been shown, has been able to impose abuses of monopo-
listic control on the Western steel consumer.'
"'Control of the Geneva plant by this company would mean that the most
promising prospect for vigorous competition in the steel markets of the Far West
would be frustrated by becoming another satellite of a tightly-controlled industry.
In this way a great industrial enterprise built by the Government would be made
to serve the interests of a great industrial trust rather than the interests of the
country as a whole.'
I "The report further declares that the provisions of the Surplus Property Act
expressly require that plants like Geneva be sold to independent competitive inter-
ests.
"The Anti-Trust Division's report is very similar to another report submitted
some time previously to Congress by former Attorney General Francis Biddle.
He likewise strongly advocated disposal of Geneva to independent Western inter-
ests. The Senate Small Business Committee noted that Clark disregarded his
predecessor's recommendations as well as those of the Anti-Trust Division.
"Clark declined to comment when informed of the disclosure of the suppressed
report."
(Reprinted with the permission of the copyright owner, North American
Newspaper Alliance and Col. Allen.)
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cent of the national capacity on January 1, 1946 and that if the capacity
of the Geneva plant were added to the present capacity of U. S. Steel
its share of national capacity will rise from 31.4 per cent to 32.7 per
cent as contrasted with its 50.1 per cent proportionate share in 1901.
The opinion also stated that the Attorney General had considered
statistics which showed that the "Far West" 31 exclusive of Geneva
had an aggregate annual ingot capacity of 3,619,000 tons of which
U. S. Steel had approximately 17.3 per cent; that total "Far Western"
capacity including Geneva would amount approximately to 4,900,000
tons; and that if Geneva were acquired by U. S. Steel it would have 39
per cent of the total capacity of the "Far West".
These statistics were related "in view of the analysis made by
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit" in the Aluminum
case. The Attorney General's opinion quoted the dictum from Judge
Hand's opinion in that case "it is doubtful whether 60 or 64 per cent
would be enough; and certainly 33 per cent is not". Mention was
made of the fact that the Aluminum decision had been cited with ap-
proval at length by the Supreme Court in the American Tobacco
case 32-but Attorney General Clark's opinion did not note that the
Supreme Court in the Tobacco case failed to cite with approval the
dictum of Judge Hand which Attorney General Clark quoted. Upon
the basis of Judge Hand's dictum, Mr. Clark concluded that he
"did not view the sale, as such, of this property by the War Assets
Administration to the United States Steel Corporation as a violation
of the anti-trust laws . . . this advice- does not extend to the conduct
or practices of the United States Steel Corporation in its use of the
property, nor do I express herein an opinion concerning the legality
or illegality of any acts or practices in which the United States Steel
Corporation or its subsidiaries may have engaged or may hereafter
engage, either alone or with others." Likewise, the approval was sub-
ject to the express condition that it should be without prejudice to
any determination of the legal status "of any pricing policy" followed
by U. S. Steel or its subsidiaries "alone or with others"."3
31. Including in this term the states of Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho,
Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado and New Mexico.
32. 328 U. S. 781 (1946) discussed in Levi, op. cit. supra note 21 and Rostow, op.
cit. supra note 21.
33. The opinion concluded with the note that the Attorney General was aware
of the fact ". . . that size carries with it the opportunity for abuse . . .", quoting
the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the U. S. v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S.
106 (1932) ". . . mere size, according to the holding of this Court is not an offense
against the Sherman Act unless magnified to the point at which it amounts to a mo-
nopoly, U. S. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920) ; U. S. v. International Har-
vester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 708 (1927), but size carries with it an opportunity for
abuse. . . " Id. at 116.
MERGERS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
Upon the rendition of this opinion, the sale of Geneva to U. S.
Steel was promptly consummated in June, 1946. Immediately upon
the transfer of the property, the president of U. S. Steel resumed
negotiations for the purchase of the assets of Consolidated Steel Cor-
poration, a company with plants in California, Texas and Arizona,
engaged solely in the fabrication of structural and plate products, pur-
chasing slightly less than half of its annual $11,000,000 worth of
rolled steel purchases from subsidiaries of U. S. Steel and the re-
mainder from competitors of that company. Since the end of World
War II, Consolidated had approached not only U. S. Steel but a num-
ber of other companies offering and making clear its desire to sell out.
Consolidated's depreciated plant had a book value of less than
ten million dollars and during the five year period, 1937-1941, it
averaged sales of "only $20 million" but during the war with Gov-
ernment-furnished facilities it had produced over one and a half billion
dollars worth of ships. The Government-owned facilities were sold
to third parties. Approximately seventy per cent of the products sold
by Consolidated consisted of those produced by plate fabrication in
which neither U. S. Steel nor any of its subsidiaries were engaged.
Sixteen per cent of its sales consisted of structural steel products, part
of which it sold in competition with subsidiaries of U. S. Steel. The
balance of its production was devoted to the manufacture of pipe but
these were of a size and dimension as admittedly to make only a small
amount of its output even arguably competitive with any of the par-
ticular types of pipe manufactured by U. S. Steel's subsidiaries. Con-
solidated sold its products for the ten years prior to 1947 in eleven
states, Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Texas, Utah and Washington."4 This area will be
referred to as the Consolidated market.
Considering the total sales of rolled steel products in the Con-
solidated market, its purchases of 2,000,000 tons over the ten year
period represent slightly more than 3 per cent of the 60,000,000 tons
of such products sold in the Consolidated market during that period;
if Consolidated's relative consumption would be limited to plates and
shapes-the principal types of rolled steel products purchased by Con-
34. It will be noted that Colorado is excluded whereas it was included by the
Attorney General in his calculations as to the proportion of the "Far Western" steel
productive capacity that U. S. Steel would acquire with the acquisition of Geneva.
Exclusion of Colorado means that U. S. Steel acquired 51 per cent of the productive
capacity in the Consolidated market as contrasted with the Attorney General's calcula-
tion of 39 per cent of the "Far Western" productive capacity. It will also be noted
that the Consolidated market includes the State of Louisiana wbich, of course, was not
included by the Attorney General in calculating the "Far Western" productive capacity.
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solidated-figures for 1937, the only "reliable" figures presented,35
showed that Consolidated's consumption of these products was ap-
proximately 13 per cent of the total sold in the Consolidated market
area. With respect to sales of structural steel fabricated products for
the five year period, 1937-1942, U. S. Steel, in the Consolidated market
booked 17 per cent and Consolidated 5 per cent of the totals, but in
1946 the sales of this type of product in the Consolidated market were
divided so that U. S. Steel had 13 per cent, Consolidated and Bethlehem
each had 11 per cent and the next largest industrial fabricators had 9,
6 and 3 per cent, respectively, of the total with the balance being divided
among eighty companies.36
B. The Litigation.
The Government filed a complaint" charging that the purchase
of Consolidated's assets by U. S. Steel would result in the elimination
of substantial competition "in the sale of rolled steel products" and
"the manufacture and sale of fabricated steel products" and that it
therefore constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Government also charged that
the agreement of purchase constituted an attempt by U. S. Steel to
monopolize "the production and sale of fabricated steel products" in
the Consolidated market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The issues framed by the complaint serve to illustrate the type
of deficiency which marred the Government's presentation both in
the trial court and before the Supreme Court. The complaint charged
that the merger would eliminate competition in the sale of "rolled steel
products" as contrasted with the sale of "plates and shapes"-the two
types of rolled steel products to which Consolidated's purchases were
largely confined and upon which issue the Government before the
35. The majority Supreme Court opinion held that ". . . Data are offered by
the Government for 1946 which are too uncertain to furnish a reliable guide ..
334 U. S. 495, 509 (1948). Furthermore, as we shall see, the majority held that
". .. in this case and on this record we have circustances that strongly indicate to us
that rolled steel production and consumption in the Consolidated market area is the
competitive area and product for consideration. . . ." Id. at 511. The failure of the
Government to introduce sufficient evidence to establish that consumption of plates and
shapes was the valid criteria, rather than the general classification "rolled steel prod-
ucts" may well have been largely responsible for the Government's failure to succeed
in preventing the merger, as the dissent was willing to enjoin the transaction solely
on this aspect of the case, being willing to assume that plates and shapes were properly
distinguishable from the general category "rolled steel products," an assumption that
the majority was unwilling to make.
36. The facts for 1946 were claimed by the Government to have been supported
by the evidence which it introduced and although the defendants disputed their accu-
racy and the lower court made no reference to them in its findings, Mr. Justice Reed's
majority opinion accepted them ". . as sufficiently reliable for our present pur-
pose. . . ." 334 U. S. 495 (1948).
37. Transcript of Record on Appeal, p. 1.
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Supreme Court sought to rely most heavily. Likewise the Govern-
ment chose to present its evidence in the form of a "paper" case con-
sisting of charts and tabulations designed apparently to establish the
extent of the competition in the Consolidated market that would be
eliminated by the proposed merger. The Government did not offer
facts with respect to the nature and structure of the steel industry-
such as the elaborate hearings and studies conducted by the TNEC 3"
showing the degree of concentrated economic power over the entire
industry exercised by U. S. Steel and the three other major steel com-
panies.39 Nor did the Government offer proof regarding the uniform
pricing system that prevails in the steel industry under the leadership
of U. S. Steel,4" both nation-wide and in the Consolidated market area;
a pricing system that has been charged by the Federal Trade Com-
mission to be illegally discriminatory. The Government did not present
either the trial court or the Supreme Court with the background of
the proposed acquisition in relation to the general nature and scope
of the merger movement and its effects in terms of the concentration
of effective market control, although as our brief introductory dis-
cussion indicates such material was readily available. Likewise no
evidence was introduced as to whether or not producers of plates and
shapes could upon losing orders for such items relatively easily manu-
facture other types of rolled steel products. The evidence adduced
from which the courts were asked to form a reasoned judgment as
to the effects of Consolidated's absorption by U. S. Steel in the Con-
solidated market area upon (a) market control or dominance and (b)
the extent and nature of the competition that would remain, consisted
mainly of tables and statistical data covering sales in the Consolidated
market.
No doubt the Government experimentation with the short form
of record technique that it adopted in the Columbia Steel case was
prompted by the desire to streamline litigations of this type with
resultant savings financially and in manpower. But in a test case like
Columbia Steel, with the background of Supreme Court decisions that
we have outlined, the failure of the Government to present a detailed
38. See TNEC, Hearings, Parts 18, 19, 20 (1939) and Part 27 (1940).
39. E. g., TNEC Monograph 27, p. 259, shows that while U. S. Steel's propor-
tionate share of total national capacity has declined since its formation that of three
other steel giants has increased enormously so that the 4 companies in 1938 controlled
more than 63 per cent of the nation's steel ingot production; see also TNEC Mono-
graph 21, analyzing the present day structure of the steel industry and the dominating
market control over that industry exercised by U. S. Steel.
40. See, e. g., TNEC Monograph 42, "The Basing Point System" (1941). Like-
wise the FTC has compiled a wealth of data on price uniformity in the steel industry
which has been introduced in the FTC proceeding against the steel industry (a com-
panion suit to its case against the Cement industry) ; see FTC Docket No. 5508.
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record meant that the courts would not have all the fundamental
economic material necessary for a proper evaluation of the issues.
Certainly the Government's failure to present the economic facts
in its briefs-utilizing the technique made famous by the late Mr.
Justice Brandeis-appears to be incomprehensible. Instead of supply-
ing either the District Court or the Supreme Court with the essential
economic materials, in terms of which the particular transaction should
have been evaluated, the Government's briefs were largely devoted to
a legal discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions in this field.
Primary emphasis was placed upon last Term's decision of the Court
in the Yellow Cab case 41 as authority for the broad proposition that
vertical integrations per se are illegal under the Sherman Act, at least
when transactions of the size of the proposed absorption of Con-
solidated-a fifteen million dollar deal-are involved.
By way of contrast with the Government's technique of presenta-
tion, counsel for the defendants, U. S. Steel, its subsidiaries, and Con-
solidated, presented a mass of testimony both oral and written de-
signed to show that:
(a) U. S. Steel was acquiring Consolidated for the legitimate
business reason of assuring itself of an outlet for the Geneva
plant production; (b) since the end of World War II Consolidated
had made efforts to sell its business not only to U. S. Steel but
to several other steel companies because it feared the return of
normal postwar competitive conditions; that Consolidated had
opened its major plant in 1929 and its existence prior to World
War II had been a precarious one-; (c) Consolidated's purchases
of rolled steel products constituted an infinitesimal part of the
nation's consumption and even a very small percentage of sales of
such products in the Consolidated market area; (d) there was
little or no competition between the structural fabricating activities
of Consolidated and those of U. S. Steel because (1) of the fact
that Consolidated did light and medium fabricating work whereas
U. S. Steel concentrated on heavy fabricated jobs and (2) it was
a rare situation in which both U. S. Steel and Consolidated sub-
mitted competitive bids and even rarer when one of them lost a
particular job to the other; (e) there was no competition between
the type of pipe manufactured by Consolidated as compared with
the type produced by United States Steel's subsidiaries because
(1) the pipes of the respective companies were of vastly different
41. 332 U. S. 218 (1947) ; for a discussion of this case, its implications and pos-
sible limitation to the particular pleadings see Zlinkoff & Barnard, op. cit. mtpra note
22, at pp. 926-932.
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gauges, constructed by different methods and predominantly used
for different purposes-evidence not disputed by the Government;
and (2) even the pipe produced by both companies for similar
purposes were of different gauges, construction and cost-Con-
solidated oil and gas pipelines being sold at thirty dollars per ton
more than that charged by U. S. Steel and uncontroverted testi-
mony was offered to the effect that Consolidated was only able
to sell its oil and gas pipelines because of the sellers' market for
this type of product now prevailing; and (f) the absence of any
intent upon the part of the defendants to monopolize or attempt
to monopolize as a motive or purpose for the Consolidated
acquisition.
The District Court accepted the defendants' view that the amount
of competition which would be eliminated between U. S. Steel and
Consolidated was too insubstantial to warrant the finding that the
merger would constitute a restraint of trade in violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act ' and that since there was no violation of Section
1 there could be none of Section 2." While the Court recognized
"that it is also clear that an unreasonable restraint may be considered
in connection with a limited geographical area", it would appear that
the trial court placed primary emphasis upon the national market
rather than the Consolidated market area in determining whether or
not the merger would eliminate any substantial amount of com-
petition."
The Government appealed contending that (a) the vertical in-
tegration presented was illegal per se; (b) the amount of competition
which would be eliminated in the Consolidated market was substantial
enough to make the proposed merger an illegal restraint of trade under
Section 1 and (c) the proposed purchase constituted an attempt to
monopolize the production and sale of fabricated steel products in the
Consolidated market in violation of Section 2.
C. The Supreme Court Decision.
Within five weeks after hearing the oral argument, the Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reed, on behalf of five of the
Justices, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Justice Douglas
wrote what will undoubtedly be a memorable dissenting opinion on
42. 74 F. Supp. 671, 672-679 (D. Del. 1947).
43. Id. at 680.
44. See also the Trial Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in
the Record at pp. 39-47.
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behalf of himself, Justices Black, Rutledge and Murphy. The majority
opinion is thirty-six pages long, rambling, and appears to have been
written in great haste. The striking contrast between the opinion by
Mr. Justice Reed in the Columbia Steel case-as well as the result in
that case-and the opinion which he wrote on behalf of the Court, and
the conclusions reached, a few months earlier in the Gypsum case 45
is largely explainable, we believe, by the difference between the detailed
record made by the Government in the Gypsum case, as contrasted with
the bare statistical type of short form record presented by it in the
Columbia Steel litigation.
Mr. Justice Reed's opinion, in the Columbia Steel case, repeatedly
emphasized the inadequacy of the record to support arguments ad-
vanced by the Government,46 and it likewise repeatedly emphasizes
that the conclusions enunciated are predicated upon "the facts of this
case".4 7  Unfortunately several of the broad statements set forth in the
majority opinion are not as carefully guarded, and, because "dictum
is very important in the monopoly cases," " may have an unfortunate,
perhaps unintended, effect, if taken out of the total context.
Precise analysis of the majority opinion is difficult because of
its repetitious nature and the manner in which the facts and applicable
legal principles are presented. Yet we believe that upon careful
analysis Mr. Justice Reed's opinion, in its essentials, may constitute a
landmark in the history of judicial efforts to cope with the problem
of the growing concentration of economic power in this country.
Grouping the facts and legal principles, the majority opinion may be
broken down into the following subjects.
1. The Market Criteria Applicable.
The majority opinion again reiterated the views that had been
expressed in this Term's decision in the Griffith case,49 namely that the
national market is not the only criterion for measuring the illegality of
restraints of trade under the Sherman Act. ". . . It is the volume in
the area which the alleged restraints affect that is important . . ." 50
45. United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364 (1948). See Zlinkoff & Barnard,
Patents, Procedure and the Sherman Act, 17 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 47-54 (1948) for
a discussion of the Gypsum decision.
46. See, e. g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 507, 509-510,
514-515, 517, 518, 529, 530 (1948).
47. Ibid.
48. Levi, op. cit. supra note 21, at 158.
49. See Zlinkoff & Barnard, The Motion Picture Industry and the Anti-Monopoly
Statutes, to appear in the December, 1948, issue of the YALE LAW JOURNAL, for a dis-
cussion of this decision.
50. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 520 (1948).
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Applying this principle, the yardstick for measuring the legality
of the merger is the Consolidated market insofar as rolled steel pur-
chases and structural fabrication is concerned, there being no dispute
that the national market was the criterion to be applied to the sale of
pipe.51 The Court's delineation of geographical area of competition,
as well as of the type of product of competition was predicated upon
the facts presented. The majority opinion expressed appreciation of
the need for flexibility in working out such concepts in diverse situa-
tions; "we recognize the difficulty of laying down a rule as to what
areas or products are competitive one with another." 52
2. The Legality of Vertical and Horizontal Integration.
As foreshadowed by Mr. Justice Douglas' statement in the
Paramount case concerning the views of the majority of the Court
upon the subject of vertical integration,53 the majority in the Columbia
Steel case squarely rejected the Government's contention that the ac-
quisition of Consolidated-and the consequent exclusion of that com-
pany as a market for the rolled steel products of competitors of U. S.
Steel-was a vertical integration which was illegal per se under the
Sherman Act.54 The fact that a subsidiary will "in all probability"
deal only with the parent for the goods that the latter can furnish does
not make the acquisition invalid per se. The Yellow Cab decision is
vitiatingly construed to have turned upon the particular pleadings
which were before the Court,55 Mr. Justice Reed claiming that "noth-
ing in the Yellow Cab case supports the theory that all exclusive deal-
ing arrangements are illegal per se." "
The majority opinion in dealing with this subject laid down the
following broad principles:
51. Id. at 516: ". . . the government claims that Consolidated and National
Tube compete on a nation-wide scale in the field of large diameter pipe for oil and
gas pipelines. Other types of pipe made by the two concerns are apparently not com-
petitive as the Government doesn't contest this assertion of the appellees. ..
52. Id. at 520: ". . . although our previous discussion has indicated the diffi-
culties in accepting the 11 state area in which Consolidated sells its products as the
relevant competitive market, we accept for the purposes of decision the Government's
argument that this area is the one to be considered in measuring the effect on competi-
tion of the withdrawal of Consolidated as a market for other rolled steel producers
and of the bringing together under common control of Consolidated and the fabricating
subsidiaries of U. S. Steel. . ....
53. See Zlinkoff & Barnard, supra note 49, for a discussion of this aspect of the
Paramount decision.
54. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 521-2, 524-5 (1948).
55. See Zlinkoff & Barnard, op. cit. supra note 22, at 926-932 for a full discussion
of the Yellow Cab case.
56. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 523 (1948). The
majority opinion in footnote 23 takes pains to point out ". . . that the legality of
contractual arrangements for exclusive dealing was sustained in United States v. Bausch
& Lomb Co., 321 U. S. 707, 728-29 (1943) . . ." but this was a 4-4 decision.
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"A restraint may be unreasonable either because a restraint
otherwise reasonable is accompanied with a specific intent to ac-
complish the forbidden restraint or because it falls within the
class of restraints that are illegal per se. For example, where a
complaint charges that the defendants have engaged in price fix-
ing, or have concertedly refused to deal with non-members of an
association, or have licensed a patented device on condition that
unpatented materials be employed in conjunction with the patented
device, then the amount of commerce involved is immaterial be-
cause such restraints are illegal per se." 17
No explanation was adduced by Mr. Justice Reed as to why
the three categories of restraints of trade outlined by him were illegal
per se and why a vertical acquisition of the size involved in the
Columbia Steel case was not illegal per se, except the statement that
"vertical integration is an indefinite term without explicit meaning"
and "it is not for the Courts to determine the course of the Nation's
economic development . . . if businesses are to be forbidden from
entering into different stages of production that order must come from
Congress not the Courts".5" The same paragraph of Mr. Justice
Reed's opinion which contains these statements also has the following
sentences "on the other hand, the Courts have been given by Congress
wide powers in monopoly regulation. The very broadness of terms
such as restraint of trade, substantial competition and purpose to
monopolize have placed upon the Courts the responsibility to apply
the Sherman Act so as to avoid the evils at which Congress aimed."
This attempt to straddle horses going in opposite directions renders
the style of the opinion much like the one by the same Justice in the
Line Material case.59
Since vertical integrations are not illegal per se what criteria for
determining the legality of such arrangements are formulated by the
57. Id. at 524. As stated in Mr. Justice Reed's opinion, however, at least a ma-
jority of the present Supreme Court favor substituting for blanket approvals or dis-
approval of exclusive dealing arrangements the following standard: "Exclusive dealings
for rolled steel between Consolidated and U. S. Steel, brought about by vertical in-
tegration or otherwise, are not illegal, at any rate until the effect of such control is to
unreasonably restrict the opportunities of competitors to market their product."
58. Id. at 526. In this same paragraph Mr. Justice Reed makes the following
amazing statement-in the light of the TNEC studies of the structure of our economy
and the specific conditions prevailing in our basic industries-". . . the basic indus-
tries, with few exceptions do not approach in America a cartelized form. . . ." Id. at
526. Compare: "Private enterprise is ceasing to be free enterprise and is becoming
a cluster of private collectivisms, masking itself as a system of free enterprise after the
American model, it has in fact become a concealed carteled system after the European
model." Message of the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 9, 1938, to Con-
gress cited with unanimous approval by the Bipartisan TNEC's Final Report and
Recommendations, op. cit. supra note 9, at 12.
59. See Zlinkoff & Barnard, op. cit. supra note 45, at pp. 42-45.
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majority opinion? The following are the basic criteria which we
distill therefrom:
(a) delineation of "the nature of the market to be served",
namely, what are the areas and types of product that are to be
considered in arriving at a judgment;
(b) the leverage on the market which the particular vertical
integration creates or makes possible, in other words, "considera-
tion of its effect on the opportunities of other competitor-producers
to market" their products; and
(c) "the purpose or intent with which the combination was
conceived. When a combination through its actual operation re-
suits in an unreasonable restraint, intent or purpose may be in-
ferred; even though no unreasonable restraint may be achieved,
nevertheless a finding of specific intent to accomplish such an
unreasonable restraint may render the actor liable under the
Sherman Act." 60
In setting forth these standards the majority opinion repeatedly
refers to and quotes from the opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas in the
Griffith and Paramount cases.6 In substance there appears to be no
conflict between the criteria formulated by Mr. Justice Reed for judg-
ing the validity of vertical integrations as compared with the condensed
statements of these criteria set forth by Mr. Justice Douglas in the
Paramount case. Applying these standards the majority concluded
that insofar as the proposed merger was a vertical integration it did
not constitute an illegal restraint of trade because it was not shown
that the merger would "unreasonably restrict the opportunities of the
competitor producers of rolled steel to market their product." 2 Upon
60. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 525 (1948). In re-
ferring to the Paramount case the majority opinion in Columbia Steel contains a dic-
tum the broad scope of which, unless construed in the total context, may possibly be
argued to vitiate the entire portion of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion dealing with di-
vestiture. Thus Mr. Justice Reed in the Columbia Steel case, says with respect to
United States v. Paramount: 'We held that control by the major producer-distributors
over nearly three-fourths of the first run theatres in cities with population over 100,000
was not of itself illegal, and we remanded the case to the District Court for further
findings." 334 U. S. 495, 524 (1948). We believe that this loosely written sentence
was probably not intended to overrule or affect in any way the majority opinions in any
of the movie cases because the majority opinion cited and quoted from the Paramount
case, and it is also to be noted that Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent in the Colum-
bia Steel case did not raise any question about the majority's treatment of his opinion
in the Paramount case. It is unlikely that if the majority opinion was intended to over-
rule any part of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in the Paramount case--rendered on be-
half of six justices-that Mr. Justice Douglas would not have raised the question
sharply.
61. For a discussion of the opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas in these two cases,
see the companion article by the authors, cited supra note 49.
62. 334 U. S. 495, 527 (1948).
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the record before it, the majority accepted as the relevant market
criteria (1) the demand for rolled steel products; and (2) the eleven
state area in which Consolidated markets its products. It is pointed
out that over a ten year period Consolidated accounted for only three
per cent of the total demand of such products in that area and that if
expectations for the development in the Western area are fulfilled,
Consolidated's proportion may be expected in the future to be lower
than three per cent. Upon the facts presented the majority concluded
that "so-called vertical integration resulting from the acquisition of
Consolidated does not unreasonably restrict the opportunities of the
competitor producers of rolled steel to market their product." If the
majority's conclusion on this phase of the case is to be criticized, we
believe that the Government must bear a considerable part of the
responsibility because of the method of presentation it adopted.
3
"The same tests which measure the legality of vertical integration
by acquisition are also applicable to the acquisition of competitors in
identical or similar lines of merchandise." 04 The market in which the
concerns compete, the extent of the competition, both actual and poten-
tial between the concerns, are the basic criteria. "In determining what
constitutes unreasonable restraint, we do not think the dollar volume
is in itself of compelling significance; we look rather to the percentage
of business controlled, the strength of the remaining competition,
whether the action springs from business requirements or purpose to
monopolize, the probable development of the industry, consumer de-
mands, and other characteristics of the market." 65 The opinion em-
phasizes the fact that fixed percentages or arbitrary standards are
too inflexible and that "the relative effect of percentage command of
a market varies with the setting in which that factor is placed." 00 It
is significant to note that the majority agreed with the Government
that the elimination of potential competition is a factor to "be taken
into consideration in weighing the effect of any acquisition of assets
on restraint of trade." 67 The difficulty that the majority found was
not so much with the Government's contentions but with lack of proof
to support its arguments.
Applying its own criteria, we believe unrealistically, the majority
held that even assuming U. S. Steel "could be expected in the future
to sell 13 per cent of the total structural steel products in the Con-
solidated trade area and that Consolidated could be expected to sell 11
63. See pp. 162-164 supra.
64. 334 U. S. 495, 527 (1948).
65. Ibid.
66. Id. at 528.
67. Ibid.
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per cent . . . It can not be said there would be an unreasonable re-
straint of trade." 68 The majority opinion, however, was careful to
limit the ruling on this phase of the case to "the present unusual con-
ditions of the Western steel industry"; the number of West Coast
fabricators that would remain; and "... the ability of out-of-the-area
fabricators to compete because of the specialized character of the struc-
tural steel production in regard to orders and designs." The opinion
expressly stated. that the holding "does not imply that additional
acquisitions of fabricating facilities for structural steel would not be-
come monopolistic . . ." 6
The inadequacy of the proof with respect to the extent of com-
petition, potential and actual, in the manufacture of pipe that would
be eliminated by the merger was likewise the basis of the majority's
holding that ". . it does not seem to us that it has been shown that
competition in this field between the parties to this contract is so
substantial that its elimination under these circumstances constitutes
an unreasonable restraint . . ." 70
One of the most important aspects of the majority opinion is the
manner in which it brushed aside the previous decisions of the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts, on the subject of mergers, and
indicated that the present Court would not consider itself hampered or
restricted by this heavily criticized group of decisions. Referring the
reader to the same vitriolic criticism of the previous Supreme Court
decisions by Professor Handler that we have already quoted,71 the court
said, "we do not stop to examine those cases to determine whether we
would now approve either their language or their holdings. The factual
situations in all those cases is so dissimilar from that presented here that
they furnish little guidance in determining whether the competition
which will be eliminated through the purchase of Consolidated is suffi-
cient to warrant injunctive relief . . ." " The most significant illustra-
tion of the difference between the approach of the majority opinion
in Columbia Steel--as contrasted with that of the Supreme Court in
the International Harvester and original Steel cases, is its refusal to
bind the Court to the adoption of any arbitrary fixed percentage rule.
On the contrary, the opinion offers an intelligible, flexible standard-
".. . we do not undertake to prescribe any set of percentage figures
by which to measure the reasonableness of a corporation's enlargement
of its activities by the purchase of the assets of a competitor. The
68. Id. at 529.
69. Ibid.
70. Id. at 531.
71. See pp. 152-153 supra.
72. 334 U. S. 495, 531 (1948).
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relative effect of percentage command of a market varies with the
setting in which that factor is placed . . ." " This sound realism
should serve to dispel the harmful effects that have been caused by
Judge Learned Hand's unfortunate dictum in the Aluminum case, to
wit, "it is doubtful whether 60 or 64 per cent would be enough;
and certainly 33 per cent is not."
3. The Proposed Merger and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
It must be noted at the outset that the Government did not charge
the U. S. Steel Corp. with an attempt to monopolize the steel industry
generally but only in ". . . the producing and selling of fabricated
steel products in the Consolidated market . . ." That little or no
importance was attached to this charge is shown by the fact that,
in its main brief before the Supreme Court, the Government devoted
exactly two pages to the subject, and, none at all in its reply brief.
The claim was based solely upon the fact that since 1924 U. S. Steel
had acquired eight steel companies, producers and fabricators, but
the details concerning these acquisitions were not presented so that
this phase of the case, like too many other aspects of the Government's
charges, was predicated upon inferences and argument rather than
economic facts. Nor was any attempt made to reconcile this charge
with the fact that Attorney General Clark a year before had sanctioned
the acquisition of Geneva by U. S. Steel, an acquisition equal in size
to all the other eight previous mergers put together.
The majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of this phase of the Government's complaint although it held
that the test applied by the trial court was too narrow "even though
the restraint effected may be reasonable under Section 1, it may con-
stitute an attempt to monopolize forbidden by Section 2 if a specific
intent to monopolize may be shown." 7" The majority correctly stated
that it would look not only to the one hundred and eighty acquisitions
consummated by U. S. Steel prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
the Government's first case against U. S. Steel as an illegal monopoly,7r5
but also to the eight acquisitions from 1924 to 1943, as well as the latest
acquisition, namely Geneva. "We think that last acquisition is of
significance in ascertaining the intent of U. S. Steel in acquiring
Consolidated." 76 This conclusion serves to underscore the extent
to which the Attorney General's opinion validating the Geneva ac-
73. Id. at 527-528.
74. Id. at 531-532.
75. United States v. U. S. Steel, 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
76. 334 U. S. 495, 532 (1948).
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quisition may have foreclosed the Court from giving proper weight
to the "intent" that might otherwise have been inferred from the
United States Steel Corporation's long history of acquisitions. Future
merger cases should not present such an obstacle to the Court's giving
the anti-monopoly statutes their full application.
There follows next in the majority opinion, however, a sentence
so strange that one wonders why Mr. Justice Reed has not with-
drawn it from his opinion as being unnecessary to the decision.
He points out that U. S. Steel's bid for Geneva emphasized the
importance of erecting fabricating facilities and that many of the
other bids had been conditioned upon the Government making grants
for erecting such facilities and he concludes, "it is doubtful whether
objections could be raised if U. S. Steel proposed to build instead of to
buy from a competitor fabricating facilities similar to those possessed
by Consolidated." 7' In its petition for rehearing, the Government
aptly, and we believe correctly, exposed the fallaciousness of this state-
ment, "We submit that there is a vital distinction, apparently over-
looked, between the case supposed and the case before the Court. To
build additional facilities, in the course of vertical integration of an
enterprise or otherwise, increases production, the flow of goods to
market, and competition in their sale. Absorption of an independent
concern, on the other hand, doesn't increase production or competition,
but it may, and in this case it indubitably does eliminate competition
both with respect to the purchase of the raw materials which the con-
cern needs for its business and with respect to the sale of the goods
which it produces . . . for to absorb an independent competitor is one
of the most effective and insidious means of restraining trade and
competition." 78
Unfortunately the record did not contain evidence that either
War Surplus Administrator General Gregory or Attorney General
Clark would not have accepted U. S. Steel's bid for Geneva if U. S.
Steel had stated or implied that it intended to buy out the largest
independent fabricators on the West Coast instead of building its own
finishing and fabricating facilities, thus eliminating competition rather
than promoting its growth.
The majority opinion concludes its discussion of this aspect of the
case by pointing out that U. S. Steel's proportions of rolled steel prod-
ucts produced in the country had declined from 50.1 per cent in 1901,
when U. S. Steel was formed, to 33.2 per cent in the period 1937-1946.
It recognized that the size of U. S. Steel was impressive and that
77. Id. at 532.
78. Government's Petition for Rehearing, pp. 5-6 ;.rehearing denied, 334 U. S. 862
(1948).
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".. . size has significance also in an appraisal of alleged violations of
the Sherman Act . . ." but it emphasized that the steel industry
".. . is also of impressive size and the welcome westward expansion
of that industry requires that the existing companies go into produc-
tion there or abandon that market to other organizations . . ." 71
D. The Dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, on behalf of four
of the Justices, differed from the majority not in the criteria fordfiulated
for determining the legality of mergers, but in the application of those
standards to the central facts presented. The dissent urged that it was
not necessary to hold all vertical integrations illegal per se in order to
find that the proposed merger would constitute an unreasonable re-
straint of trade. It urged that the elimination of Consolidated as a
market for the purchase of rolled steel products, and particularly plates
and shapes, of U. S. Steel's competitors rendered the proposed ac-
quisition an illegal restraint of trade. It was pointed out that Con-
solidated's business amounts to around $22,000,000 annually and that
its competitive purchases of rolled steel products are over $5,000,000 a
year. ". . . I do not see how it is possible to say that $5,000,000 of
commerce is immaterial. It plainly is not de minimis . . . At least it
can be said here, as it was in International Salt Co. v. U. S., 332 U. S.
392, 396, that the volume of business restrained by this contract is
not insignificant or insubstantial . . ." 80
The greater part of the dissenting opinion was devoted, however,
to a reiteration of the late Mr. Justice Brandeis' views on the evils of
bigness. Fallacies inherent in the arguments of the proponents of big
business and claimed to have been demonstrated by the late Justice
in his book "The Curse of Bigness" as well as several of the TNEC
Monographs are quoted at length. "We have here the problem of big
business. Its lesson should have by now been burned into our memory
by Brandeis."
The dissent then pointed out that control of prices in the steel
industry is (a) a powerful leverage on our economy; and (b)
". .. size in steel is the measure of the power of a handful of men
over our economy .. ." " The dissenting opinion concludes with a
statement of economic philosophy-with which we do not believe Mr.
Justice Reed is in fundamental disagreement-that furnishes the ex-
planation of the motivating force behind the decisions of the Supreme
Court in practically all of the cases that we have reviewed in our studies
79. 334 U. S. 495, 533 (1948).
80. Id. at 537.
81. Id. at 536.
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of the trade regulation decisions rendered by the Court during its
October 1947 Term.
"Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of
elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an in-
dustrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized. It
should be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the
people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political
prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men.
The fact that they are not vicious men but respectable and socially
minded is immaterial. That is the philosophy and command of
the Sherman Act. It is founded on a theory of hostility to the
concentration in private hands of power so great that only a Gov-
ernment of the people should have it." 82
E. Critique: The Columbia Steel Decision.
Counsel for the defendants in anti-trust litigations have warmly
embraced the majority decision in the Columbia Steel case and have
urged that it constitutes a basic change in the construction of the anti-
trust laws by the Supreme Court."3 Such a viewpoint stems, we be-
lieve, from a misunderstanding of the meaning and significance of the
substance of Mr. Justice Reed's opinion when read in its totality. True
that opinion has shortcomings of style and is encumbered with loose
language unessential to the decision, but, in its fundamentals, the
Columbia Steel decision may furnish the federal judiciary with the
82. Id. at 536-537.
83. On the same day that the Supreme Court's decision in the Columbia Steel case
was handed down, the opinion of the District Court was filed in the case of United
States v. Standard Oil of California, 78 F. Supp. 850 (S. D. Cal. 1948), wherein the
Court held an exclusive arrangement system with filling station dealers was illegal
under the anti-trust laws. Promptly thereafter counsel for the defendants filed a
lengthy motion for reargument on the basis of the Columbia Steel decision. District
Judge Yanklwich refused to hold that the Columbia Steel decision constituted grounds
for reversing his former opinion. "At the outset, I advert to the fact that the range
of the ruling that I made is not to be determined by the arguments which the Govern-
ment advanced, but by what was actually decided." Id. at 876. Clearly and succinctly
Judge Yankwich pointed out the narrow pleadings in the Columbia Steel case; the
narrow scope of the inquiry; that the Government's position was weakened by the
opinion of the Attorney General validating the acquisition of Geneva: ". . . on the
whole, it is evident that the decision in the Columbia Steel Co. case can not be given
the broad scope which the defendants claim for it. It is canitlied in the narrow chan-
nel which the facts in the case established. . . . in the present case, as appears from
the original opinion, we are dealing not with probabilities but Zth actualities. . ..
Id. at 879 (emphasis added). Probable jurisdiction was noted by the Supreme Court
in this case, Oct. 18, 1948. 69 Sup. Ct. 69 (1948).
Several suits similar to the Standard Oil case have been filed recently by the Gov-
ernment; e. g., United States v. International Harvester, CCH TRADE REG. SERV.
161,149 (D. Minn., Sept. 9, 1948), charging the big-three farm machinery manufac-
turers with violating the anti-trust acts by virtue of their exclusive franchise agree-
ments with local dealers, as the result of which it is claimed competing manufacturers
are denied access to vital market outlets. See also United States v. Railway Express
Co., CCH TRADE REG. SERv. 1 61,151 (D. Del., Sept. 17, 1948). The FTC has like-
wise commenced a number of similar proceedings, e. g., National Aluminum Co.
(March 30, 1948), CCH TRADE REG. SERv. 13,722; Gamble Skogmo, Inc. (July 20,
1948), CCH TRADE REG. SERv. 13,782.
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most helpful criteria yet formulated by the Supreme Court as a means
of dealing effectively with the growing concentration of economic
power which threatens to undermine and destroy both our political
democracy and our system of private, free competitive enterprise. The
criteria adopted by the majority (from which there was no dissent)
for determining the legality of vertical and horizontal integrations
make intelligent economic sense, even though regrettably narrower
than those enunciated in the Yellow Cab and International Salt cases."4
The standards represent the substitution of intelligent economic think-
ing for the hodge podge to be found in the prior decisions of the
Supreme Court upon this subject. In this respect the majority opinion
is like those of Mr. Justice Rutledge in the Scophony and National
City Line cases decided this Term where practical business standards
were substituted for metaphysical and abstract legal concepts that had
previously dominated in the decisions of the Court in the particular
fields with which these two cases dealt. Dissatisfaction with the
majority opinion in the Columbia Steel case will stem not from the
legal principles laid down, but from their application to the particular
situation before the Court. The aspect of the majority opinion per-
haps most open to criticism on this score is that portion which dealt
with the legality of the Columbia Steel merger in terms of the resulting
horizontal integration. There will be those who contend that this por-
tion of the majority decision supports the broad thesis that no illegal
restraint of trade results from a merger that places 24 per cent of a
basic industry-such as structural steel-within the control of a single
company whereas previously there had been a competitive situation.
This contention overlooks the majority's position that a merger case
is not governed by percen~tages but by a consideration of the com-
petitive situation in which the merger is made. It is regrettable, how-
ever, that support for an argument of this character should be furnished
by Mr. Justice Reed's unrealistic application of his economically sound
criteria to the facts of the case before the Court.
It is only conjectural why the Government should have chosen as
its first case, since 1933, a situation where the Attorney General, on the
basis of an unsound circuit court of appeals dictum-predicated
upon outmoded Supreme Court decisions-had rendered an opinion
stating that an increase in the proportionate share of "Far West" steel
ingot capacity from 17 to 39 per cent did not violate the anti-trust laws.
The Government's failure to present completely the picture of the
steel industry in support of its charge of illegal intent, U. S. Steel's
growth by acquisitions, the price leadership by U. S. Steel. and its use
84. See pp. 167-168, 174 supra.
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of the basing point system (aspects which the Attorney General's
opinion expressly left open as an escape clause) invited a judicial
decision quite different in scope from the one handed down by Mr.
Justice Reed for the majority of the Supreme Court. Instead of a
resounding defeat, the Supreme Court may have presented the Execu-
tive branch of our Government with a new charter for enabling it,
including the administrative agencies such as the Federal Trade Com-
mission, to deal effectively with the increasing growth of monopoly
power with its attendant dangers. True, as we have indicated, there is
some ill chosen and loose language in the majority opinion but on the
whole that document is a challenge and a warning. The Supreme Court
has served notice that it is prepared to judge the legality of corporate
mergers and combinations upon the basis of economic realities and it
has challenged the Executive branch of our Government to present
adequate economic material to it in cases of this character.
There will be those who will contend that the decision is a
severe blow to any effective legal action against the growth of
monopoly power because it will permit small acquisition after small
acquisition to be consummated. While this is a possible construction
of the Columbia Steel case, we do not think that it is a fair, adequate,
or necessary one as shown by the fact that the Court served notice
on U. S. Steel that its ruling with respect to the acquisition of Con-
solidated "does not imply that additional acquisitions of fabricating
facilities for structural steel would not become monopolistic." Further-
more, we believe that the majority opinion indicates a willingness of the
present Supreme Court to reconsider, and perhaps plug, the loopholes in
Section 7 of the Clayton Act created by the Supreme Court of the
Coolidge-Hoover era, and to apply that section to acquisitions of assets
where such transactions are an indirect way of accomplishing precisely
the same result as stock acquisitions.85
It remains to be seen whether the Executive branch of our Gov-
ernment will make full use of its new charter, and whether the lower
federal courts will carry out the mandate which the Supreme Court
has given them. Naturally fulfillment of these tasks will require far
more adequate financial grants to the anti-trust division and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission than Congress has made in the past.
85. See United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U. S. 495, 507 (1948). ". . . This
was not a purchase of stock of a competing company. See § 7, Clayton Act, 38 STAT.
730, 731; Federal Trade Comm. v. Western Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554. It must bf
assumed, however, that the public policy announced by § 7 of the Clayton Act is to
be taken into consideration in determining whether acquisition of assets of Consoli-
dated by U. S. Steel with the same economic results as the purchase of the stock
violates the prohibitions of the Sherman Act against unreasonable restraints. See
Handler, Inzdustrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL. L. REv. 179, 266
(1932)." See also note 3 supra.
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The validity of the analysis and interpretation we have presented
with respect to the Columbia Steel decision may be tested by what the
Supreme Court does on the appeal from District Judge Yankwich's
decision in the anti-trust prosecution by the Government against
Standard Oil of California; " but that is a chapter yet to be written.
Meanwhile the Capehart Committee-recently created by the Senate
(in the closing days of the 80th Congress) 87 to investigate the effect
of the Cement " and other decisions ". . . construing Federal statutes
relating to the regulation of trade practices . . ."-could render a real
contribution to the preservation of our democracy, if it would pry
loose from the pigeon holes to which they have been consigned the
bills designed to carry out the recommendations of the bi-partisan
TNEC for strengthening the anti-trust laws with reference to mergers.8 9
We think it significant that in the hearings conducted by the Cape-
hart Committee to determine whether or not the proposed inquiry
should be voted, Senator O'Mahoney called attention to the work in
this field that had been done by the TNEC-which had numbered
among its members the late Senator Borah and former Republican
National Chairman Representative Carroll Reece-and how legislation
designed to carry out their recommendations had been "bottled up" in
various committees." The Senator emphasized that he believed that
lack of legislation was responsible for the situation with respect to the
concentration of economic power into fewer and fewer hands, "getting
progressively worse from year to year." "' It is hopeful to note that
Senator Capehart, Chairman of the Senate Committee, replied that the
purpose of the proposed investigation "is to do possibly what you have
in mind and what the Congress and the Government have failed to do
over the past twenty years. I think you have made a perfect case here
for a thorough study of this whole problem . . . And I agree with you
100 per cent that the situation is getting progressively worse and is
much worse today than it was even twenty years ago. I agree with
that. And I think it is time that something should be done about it.
That Congress should study it." 92 But if these promises of a legis-
86. See note 83 spra.
87. SEN. REP. No. 241, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948).
88. For a full discussion of the Cement decision of the Supreme Court, see the
companion article by the authors, Basing Points and Quantity Discounts, 48 COL. L.
REv. 985 (1948).
89. For an excellent study of the provisions and background of the pending legis-
lative proposals see Comment, Corporate Consolidation and the Concentration of Eco-
nomic Power: Proposals for Revitalization of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 57 YALE
L. J. 613 (1948).
90. Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Interstate Commerce on S.
Res. 241. 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 41-47 (1948).
91. Id. at 47.
92. Id. at 54, 57.
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lative contribution should come to naught after election time it is to
be hoped that the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary will at least
continue their restoration of the original spirit and scope of the Clay-
ton Act so long denied effective expression because of restrictive
judicial interpretation.
[After this article had been sent to the printer, the American public
expressed themselves decisively at the polls and elected both a Demo-
cratic Senate and House of Representatives. It remains to be seen
what steps, if any, will be taken to enact the legislation needed for
dealing with the problems we have discussed. Senator Capehart, a
leading Republican, openly challenging the majority party to do some-
thing about the problem of big business getting bigger and small
business smaller, has pointedly remarked, "Congressman Patman
doesn't have to study what's happened to little business because during
the last sixteen years little business has been getting smaller and big
business is getting bigger. They (the Democrats) always throw
up their hands and cry 'monopoly, monopoly, monopoly', when they
are the ones who are running the Government." 9
The challenge to the new Congress to act on the problem of
monopoly and increasing concentration of economic power 91 has been
forcefully put by one of the country's astute financial editors:
"Our nation's economic and social greatness originated in
the independent, small businesses; our entire history reveals our
deep fear of monopoly.
Yet, despite our background and traditions, the trend toward
concentration of economic power has continued and flourished.
It is up to you, in this generation, to decide what shall be
done. And in this one, all of us must participate. For we will be
deciding the future of the American system." 9]
93. N. Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1948, p. 41, col. 5. See also N. Y. Sun, Nov. 17, 1948,
p. 36, col. 3.
94. The Small Business Committee of the House of Representatives has been ex-
tremely active recently in conducting hearings designed to lay the groundwork for the
introduction of legislation strengthening the anti-trust laws. See, e. g., a report of
the testimony given the Committee by former Assistant Attorney General Wendell
Berge, Journal of Commerce, Nov. 19, 1948, p. 1, col. 6.
95. Sylvia Porter, N. Y. Post, Nov. 18, 1948, p. 28, col. 1.
